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Position Paper

Committee: The International Press Corps

Topic: Asymmetric Warfare and its implications on national sovereignty

Portfolio: BBC News for DISEC-B

Delegate: Ankan Chatterjee

"Journalism can never be silent: That is its greatest virtue and its greatest fault. It must speak, and speak immediately, while the echoes of wonder, the claims of triumph and the signs of horror are still in the air"                                                         - Henry Grunewald

BBC- The Genesis

 In earlier days BBC news didn’t have the permission to broadcast news before 7:00 pm. In the 1950s, Kenneth Kendall was the first person to appear in vision. The news channel became popular only after the stimulation of the live events of Elizabeth II’s coronation in 1953. In 1st January 1960, Hugh Carleton Greene became Director-General. On 20th June 1960, Nan Winton became the first female BBC network newsreader who appeared in vision. On 20th April 1964, BBC2 started transmission and broadcasting a new show called Newsroom. And subsequently, many programmes were launched such as The World at One, The World This Weekend. In 1969 the BBC moved its production out of Alexandra Palace to White City, West London which later became the headquarters of BBC News. The move to a smaller studio with better technical facilities allowed Newsroom and News Review replaced the back projection with colour-separation overlay. During the 1960s, satellite communication had become possible which again improved the condition of the news channel. On 14th September 1970, the first Nine O’ Clock News was broadcasted on television by Robert Dougall which was described by The Guardian. Angela Rippon became the first female news representer of the Nine O’ Clock news in 1975. By 1982, ENG technology had become sufficiently reliable. Bernard Hesketh won the "Royal Television Society Cameraman of the Year" award by using an Ikegami camera.

Past Lessons

“War is the continuation of politics by other means,” said Carl Von Clausewitz. For historical example: US intervention in Vietnam, where the US lost the war because it had less at stake than did North Vietnam. Over time, the US failed to coerce North Vietnam and was eventually forced by an angry and frustrated American public to withdraw short of achieving its main political objective: a viable, independent non-Communist Vietnam. In modern warfare, since the Cold War, whether in the area of military technological advances or a reduction in the global military footprints such as Iran, Russia or the US have made ample use of covert Asymmetrical Warfare by outsourcing military combat. The Obama's administration's decision to drop its Syrian Train and Equip Program in 2015 and to grant the Kurdish People's Protection Units leadership of SDF, disregarded potential local and regional frictions. When pressured by Turkey, the Trump administration once again favored a short reactionary approach in the form of a swift exit strategy. The US, undoubtedly, implemented a disastrous policy, subsequently, overestimating the cost-benefit of a proxy partner in Syria

Closing Remarks

• As a representative of BBC News agency the asymmetrical warfare and its implications should be discussed at Model United Nation so that no country faces this kind of unusual tensions.

• The discussions on this topic should also uphold the international security, unity and sovereignty of all the nations.

• In this age of information and mass communications, critical importance is not just the scale of armed asymmetrical warfare and its direct human and material costs, but also its destabilizing effect on national, international, human and public security and its ability to affect politics.

•  Due to the multifaceted nature of Asymmetrical warfare, a successful strategic vision to counter it requires the integration of a plethora of capabilities, and close cooperation and coordination among an unprecedented number of bureaucracies of many agencies and services- civilian and military, covert and overt, public and private, domestic and foreign, which have those capabilities.

• We, at BBC, count on the States to work together to prevent potential disasters. We, count on the Council to lead, for, it is not merely a case of simple letting weapons fall into the wrong hands. There are no rights hands for wrong weapons.

• Asymmetrical conflicts ranging from catastrophic terrorism to military intervention in interstate, ethnic and civil wars are the most likely threats to a country's national security, sovereignty and interests

Format of Newsletter

 You do not have to worry about the newsletter as it is published by the Editor of IPC. Actually it is the collection of your interviews or Op-eds or any creativity upon the topic.

1. Name of the newspaper (left side)

2. Day and date (right side)

3. Body ( The notes that you are taking during the committee sessions)

4. Remember that you should not post your own opinions. Here you will only post those facts which are being discussed in your committee sessions.

5. For a better knowledge check your respective News channel in the Google.

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Op-Ed ( Opinionated Editorial )

In an Op-ed you can express your own point of view regarding the topics. Give an attractive headline above. Also do not forget to mention your agency and your designated committee.

Opening Speech

Honourable Chair and respected delegates of the noble committees, thank you very much for your presence.

Today, Asymmetrical warfare has been a common term in all warfare as there are no identical belligerents. And it can be fought at different levels such as an operational level, a military strategic level and a political-strategic level. Taking in the view of US intervention in Iraq in 2003-14 and US intervention in Vietnam in 1965, I want to just highlight that in this age of information and mass communications critical importance is not just the scale of armed terrorist violence and its direct human and material costs, but also its destabilizing effect on national, international, human and public security and its ability to affect politics. I as a responsible delegate of BBC News Agency will check the transparency, accountability of other delegates representing the international community. We, at BBC truly believe that the pen is indeed mightier than the sword. I look forward to productive and constructive discussions today. Thank you for your attention!

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (New York, 15 December 1997) OBJECTIVES

The objective of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (the Convention) is to enhance international cooperation among States in devising and adopting effective and practical measures for the prevention of the acts of terrorism, and for the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators.

KEY PROVISIONS

 Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal devices in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or extensive destruction likely to result or actually resulting in major economic loss. Any person also commits such an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth above or participates as an accomplice in an offence, organizes or directs others to commit an offence or in any other way contributes to the commission of such an offence by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. The Convention does not apply where an act of this nature does not involve any international elements as defined by the Convention. Parties are required to establish jurisdiction over and make punishable, under their domestic laws, the offences described, to extradite or submit for prosecution persons accused of committing or aiding in the commission of the offences, and to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings under the Convention. The offences referred to in the Convention are deemed to be extraditable offences between Parties under existing extradition treaties and under the Convention itself.

 ENTRY INTO FORCE

 The Convention entered into force on 23 May 2001 (article 22).

HOW TO BECOME A PARTY

The Convention is closed for signature. It is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. The Convention is open to accession by any State (article 21).

 OPTIONAL AND/OR MANDATORY DECLARATIONS AND NOTIFICATIONS

Pursuant to Article 6(2), a Party may establish additional jurisdiction over offences under the Convention when the offence is committed under certain circumstances. Upon ratification, acceptance, approval or accession to the Convention, each Party shall notify the Secretary-General of the jurisdiction it has established in accordance with article 6 (2) (article 6). The Party where an alleged offender is prosecuted shall, in accordance with its domestic law or applicable procedures, communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the Secretary-General (article 16).

RESERVATIONS

 The Convention is silent with regard to reservations. Pursuant to Article 20 (2), States may declare that they do not consider themselves bound by article 20 (1), according to which disputes among Parties relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention which are not settled by negotiation will be submitted to arbitration and, failing agreement on the organization of the arbitration six months after the date of the request for arbitration, to the International Court of Justice (Article 20).

DENUNCIATION/WITHDRAWAL

 Any Party may denounce the Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which the notification is received by the Secretary-General (article 23).

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)

Adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, is often described as an international bill of rights for women. Consisting of a preamble and 30 articles, it defines what constitutes discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for national action to end such discrimination.

The Convention defines discrimination against women as "...any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field."

By accepting the Convention, States commit themselves to undertake a series of measures to end discrimination against women in all forms, including:

• to incorporate the principle of equality of men and women in their legal system, abolish all discriminatory laws and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination against women;                          

• to establish tribunals and other public institutions to ensure the effective protection of women against discrimination; and

• to ensure the elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons, organizations or enterprises.

The Convention provides the basis for realizing equality between women and men through ensuring women's equal access to, and equal opportunities in, political and public life -- including the right to vote and to stand for election -- as well as education, health and employment. States Parties agree to take all appropriate measures, including legislation and temporary special measures so that women can enjoy all their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Convention is the only human rights treaty which affirms the reproductive rights of women and targets culture and tradition as influential forces shaping gender roles and family relations. It affirms women's rights to acquire, change or retain their nationality and the nationality of their children. States parties also agree to take appropriate measures against all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of women.

Countries that have ratified or acceded to the Convention are legally bound to put its provisions into practice. They are also committed to submit national reports, at least every four years, on measures they have taken to comply with their treaty obligations.

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism Enters into Force

On July 7, 2007, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism enters into force. July 7 is the 30th day after the receipt of the 22nd instrument of ratification (from Bangladesh), which the Convention required for its entry into force (Article 25.1). This Insight describes this Convention and its place in the global efforts underway to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism.

Background to the Convention

The idea for a treaty on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism originated in the 1990s in the wake of growing concerns about the threat of terrorists using nuclear or radiological material. Worries about terrorists gaining access to nuclear materials date back to earlier periods, as illustrated by the adoption in 1980 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The post-Cold War surge of fears about terrorism generally and, more specifically, terrorism involving biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological agents led to the establishment by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in December 1996 of an Ad Hoc Committee mandated "to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related existing international instruments, and thereafter to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism."

Since its establishment, the Ad Hoc Committee has produced three treaties that the UN General Assembly adopted and that have entered into force: the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted in 1997; entered into force in 2001); the International Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (adopted in 1999; entered into force in 2002); and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Convention) (adopted in 2005; entered into force in 2007). The Convention represents, therefore, the first anti-terrorism treaty adopted after September 11, 2001. Despite the relevance of many international legal instruments to nuclear terrorism, the UN General Assembly and the Ad Hoc Committee created the Convention because "existing multilateral legal provisions do not adequately address those attacks."

Overview of the Convention

The Convention adopts the approach taken in many previous anti-terrorism treaties. It requires States Parties to make certain acts criminal offences in national law, establish jurisdiction over such offences, prosecute or extradite persons alleged to have committed the defined criminal offences, and engage in cooperation and mutual legal assistance with respect to objectives of the Convention. The frequent use and familiarity of this approach helped the negotiations make progress, but questions exist about the adequacy of this strategy for counteracting nuclear terrorism. The following paragraphs describe in more detail the substantive provisions of the Convention and identify some issues that arose during the negotiations.

Offences under the Convention

Article 2 defines what actions constitute offences within the meaning of the Convention. Any person who unlawfully and intentionally possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses any nuclear or radioactive explosive or dispersal device (or attempts to do so) with the intent to cause (1) death or serious bodily injury, or (2) substantial damage to property or the environment has committed an offence under the Convention. An offence is also committed when a person unlawfully and intentionally uses any radioactive material or dispersal device or uses or damages a nuclear facility (or attempts to do so), in a manner that releases or risks release of radioactive material with the intent to (1) cause death or serious bodily injury, (2) substantial damage to property or the environment, or (3) compel a natural or legal person, an international organization, or a State to do or refrain from doing an act. A person also commits an offence if he or she participates as an accomplice, organizes or directs others to commit an offence, or in any other way contributes to the commission of an offence by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.

National criminal law obligations under the Convention

The Convention requires States Parties to establish as criminal acts under national law the offences set forth in Article 2 and to make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties that take into account their grave nature (Article 5). A State Party must take jurisdiction over the offences in Article 2 when the offence is committed (1) in the territory of a State Party, (2) onboard a vessel flying the flag of the State Party or an aircraft registered under the laws of a State Party, or (3) by a national of the State Party (Article 9.1). A State Party may establish jurisdiction over offences when the offence is committed (1) against a national of the State Party, (2) against a government facility of the State Party located abroad, or (3) by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of the State Party (Article 9.2).

States Parties must, after appropriate investigation, either prosecute or extradite a person alleged to have committed an offence defined in Article 2 (Articles 10 and 11). States Parties must ensure that such criminal offences have no justification under national law (Article 6). National law must also make the offences in the Convention extraditable (Article 13) and must not interpret such offences as a political offence for purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance (Article 15). States Parties are required to afford each other the greatest measure of assistance in connection with investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings brought against those alleged to have committed the offences identified in Article 2 (Article 14).

No obligation to extradite or afford mutual legal assistance arises if a requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that extradition or mutual legal assistance request has been made for purposes of prosecuting or punishing a person's on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion (Article 16). The Convention also contains provisions according to those alleged with committing offences related to nuclear terrorism with specific rights, including the right to communicate with and be visited by a representative of the State of which the person is a national (Article 10) and all rights accorded by the State in which the person is held and rights protected by applicable provisions of international law (Article 12).

Exclusions from the Convention's application

The Convention does not apply to offences committed within a single State Party and when (1) the alleged perpetrator and the victims are nationals of that State Party, (2) the alleged offender is found in the territory of that State Party, and (3) no other State Party has a basis under the Convention to exercise jurisdiction (Article 3).

The negotiations confronted disagreements about whether the Convention should apply to State actions involving nuclear materials or weapons. According to the South African negotiating coordinator, "some delegations had expressed concern that the convention exempts military activities and personnel from prosecution for similar offences as those articulated in the treaty. Other delegations would have liked to see the treaty protect against acts of terrorism committed by state actors involving nuclear weapons or materials." These negotiating disagreements about the Convention's scope relate to long-standing controversies about the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons by States.

In order to be adopted by consensus, the Convention did not address issues involving State and military possession and use of nuclear weapons and materials. Thus, the Convention does not apply to the activities of armed forces during armed conflicts that are governed by international humanitarian law, nor does it apply to activities undertaken by a State Party's military forces in the exercise of their official duties, to the extent such activities are governed by other rules of international law (Article 4.2). The Convention does not address in any way the issue of the legality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons by States (Article 4.3).

Handling radioactive material, devices, or nuclear facilities

States Parties that seize or otherwise take control of radioactive materials, devices or nuclear facilities following the commission of an offence are required to render the material, device, or facility harmless and to ensure any nuclear material is secured in accordance with IAEA safeguards (Article 18.1). The Convention also contains rules for the return of radioactive material, devices, or nuclear facilities to the State Party to which it belongs or from which it was stolen (Article 18).

States Parties are obliged to prevent offences identified in the Convention by making every effort to adopt measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material, taking into account International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations (Article 8). Given the importance of preventing radioactive materials from being stolen or diverted by terrorists, the Convention's very brief and general approach to prevention obligations does not advance the prevention agenda in terms of international law.

Context and Prospects for the Convention's Implementation

Upon its entry into force, the Convention becomes part of a growing array of instruments and initiatives aimed at preventing and responding to acts of nuclear terrorism. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, States have launched a series of efforts to address the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the:

• Establishment of the IAEA's Plan of Activities to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism (2002);

• Creation by the G-8 of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003);

• Launch of the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict WMD-related shipments and stop proliferation-related financing (2003); 

• Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 requiring UN members to enact national legal measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD to non-State actors (2004);

• Amendment to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials that, among other things, created expanded duties to secure nuclear materials in storage and during transit and to criminalize sabotage against civilian nuclear facilities (2005); 

• Establishment of the IAEA Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification to explore strategies to improve safeguards for monitoring and enforcement of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2005); 

• Creation of the U.S.-Russian Bratislava Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative to expand bilateral efforts to improve nuclear security (2005); and

• Launch of the U.S.-Russian led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (2006).

Although concerns about nuclear proliferation by States, triggered by the actions of North Korea and Iran, have dominated headlines in recent years, the continued international activities to prevent nuclear terrorism, which now includes the legally binding Convention, demonstrate that many States remain concerned about this threat and are willing to integrate international legal instruments into the fight against nuclear terrorism. The Convention's contribution to these efforts will increase as the number of States Parties grows and the Convention's implementation by States Parties reinforces other national, bilateral, and multilateral activities designed to fight against acts of nuclear terrorism.

These various bilateral and multilateral activities combine to produce a "web of prevention" with respect to the threat of nuclear terrorism. The initiatives and instruments forming the web do not, however, eliminate concerns that the regime against nuclear terrorism still does not contain specific, detailed standards for the physical protection of radioactive materials and nuclear facilities from terrorists or mechanisms to improve physical protection efforts within States. The Convention advances neither of these tasks directly.

Different approaches to improving the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities exist. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism seeks to use a coalition of willing partner States to "improve accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive substances, as well as security of nuclear facilities." A different approach appears in one expert's arguments that "[t]he Security Council, backed up by its 1540 Committee, should move ahead to establish effective standards for physical protection of nuclear facilities around the world. It should consider assigning to the IAEA the task of conducting a series of inspections to see whether these standards are being met."

In all likelihood, addressing the perceived gap in specific, detailed, and monitored standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities will evolve through a combination of efforts within the web of prevention and will not occur through the adoption of a comprehensive, binding treaty.

What is international humanitarian law?

 International humanitarian law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict. International humanitarian law is part of international law, which is the body of rules governing relations between States. International law is contained in agreements between States – treaties or conventions –, in customary rules, which consist of State practise considered by them as legally binding, and in general principles. International humanitarian law applies to armed conflicts. It does not regulate whether a State may actually use force; this is governed by an important, but distinct, part of international law set out in the United Nations Charter. Where did international humanitarian law originate? International humanitarian law is rooted in the rules of ancient civilizations and religions – warfare has always been subject to certain principles and customs. Universal codification of international humanitarian law began in the nineteenth century. Since then, States have agreed to a series of practical rules, based on the bitter experience of modern warfare. These rules strike a careful balance between humanitarian concerns and the military requirements of States. As the international community has grown, an increasing number of states have contributed to the development of those rules. International humanitarian law forms today a universal body of law. Where is international humanitarian law to be found? A major part of international humanitarian law is contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Nearly every state in the world has agreed to be bound by them. The Conventions have been developed and supplemented by two further agreements: the Additional Protocols of 1977 relating to the protection of victims of armed conflicts. Other agreements prohibit the use of certain weapons and military tactics and protect certain categories of people and goods. These agreements include the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, plus its two protocols; the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and its five protocols; the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention; the 1997 Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines; the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. Many provisions of international humanitarian law are now accepted as customary law – that is, as general rules by which all States are bound. When does international humanitarian law apply? International humanitarian law applies only to armed conflict; it does not cover internal tensions or disturbances such as isolated acts of violence. The law applies only once a conflict has begun, and then equally to all sides regardless of who started the fighting. International humanitarian law distinguishes between international and non-international armed conflict. International armed conflicts are those in which at least two States are involved. They are subject to a wide range of rules, including those set out in the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. Non-international armed conflicts are those restricted to the territory of a single State, involving either regular armed forces fighting groups of armed dissidents or armed groups fighting each other. A more limited range of rules apply to internal armed conflicts and are laid down in Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions as well as in Additional Protocol II. It is important to differentiate between international humanitarian law and human rights law. While some of their rules are similar, these two bodies of law have developed separately and are contained in different treaties. In particular, human rights law – unlike international humanitarian law – applies in peacetime, and many of its provisions may be suspended during an armed conflict. What does international humanitarian law cover? International humanitarian law covers two areas: the protection of those who are not, or no longer, taking part in fighting; restrictions on the means of warfare – in particular weapons – and the methods of warfare, such as military tactics. What is “protection”? International humanitarian law protects those who do not take part in the fighting, such as civilians and medical and religious military personnel. It also protects those who have ceased to take parts, such as wounded, shipwrecked and sick combatants and prisoners of war. These categories of person are entitled to respect for their lives and their physical and mental integrity. They also enjoy legal guarantees. They must be protected and treated humanely in all circumstances, with no adverse distinction. More specifically: it is forbidden to kill or wound an enemy who surrenders or is unable to fight; the sick and wounded must be collected and cared for by the party in whose power they find themselves. Medical personnel, supplies, hospitals and ambulances must all be protected. There are also detailed rules governing the conditions of detention for prisoners of war and how civilians are to be treated when under the authority of an enemy power. This includes the provision of food, shelter and medical care, and the right to exchange messages with their families. The law sets out a number of clearly recognizable symbols which can be used to identify protected people, places and objects. The main emblems are the red cross, the red crescent and the symbols identifying cultural property and civil defence facilities. What restrictions are there on weapons and tactics? International humanitarian law prohibits all means and methods of warfare which: fail to discriminate between those taking part in the fighting and those, such as civilians, who are not, the purpose being to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian property;  cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; cause severe or long-term damage to the environment. Humanitarian law has therefore banned the use of many weapons, including exploding bullets, chemical and biological weapons, blinding laser weapons and anti-personnel mines. Is international humanitarian law complied with? Sadly, there are countless examples of violation of international humanitarian law. Increasingly, the victims of war are civilians. However, there are important cases where international humanitarian law has made a difference in protecting civilians, prisoners, the sick and the wounded, and in restricting the use of barbaric weapons. Given that this body of law applies during times of extreme violence, implementing the law will always be a matter of great difficulty. That said, striving for effective compliance remains as urgent as ever. What should be done to implement the law? Measures must be taken to ensure respect for international humanitarian law. States must teach its rules to their armed forces and the general public. They must prevent violations or punish them if these nevertheless occur. In particular, they must enact laws to punish the most serious violations of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, which are regarded as war crimes. The States must also pass laws protecting the red cross and red crescent emblems. Measures have also been taken at an international level: tribunals have been created to punish acts committed in two recent conflicts (the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda). An international criminal court, with the responsibility of repressing inter alia war crimes, was created by the 1998 Rome Statute. Whether as individuals or through governments and various organizations, we can all make an important contribution to compliance with international humanitarian law. 07/2004. 

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